ABSTRACT The fourth industrial revolution, also known as Industry 4.0, brings many advantages including innovative applications and services, new technologies and advanced features, increased operational benefits, and reduced installation costs. However, this technological advancement also exposes several challenges pertaining to the development of cyber-physical industrial architectures, resilient communication systems, and secure data exchange. This paper develops a systematic methodology for designing intrusion detection systems (IDS) specially tailored to address the cyber and physical dimensions of these systems. The approach is aimed at reducing the number of monitored parameters by adopting a three-phase design strategy embracing sensitivity analysis, cross-association, and optimal IDS design. To this end, phase 1 embraces sensitivity analysis to identify sensitive variables to specific interventions (e.g., control signals and cyber attacks), phase 2 adopts the cross-association assessment to optimally structure the process variables in groups that are the most sensitive to groups of interventions, and finally, phase 3 optimally assigns the most sensitive process variables to IDS, while enforcing the IDS capacity limitations and redundancy requirements. Numerical results on a realistic vinyl acetate monomer process show that the approach can reduce the number of variables by 76.8%, thus reducing the complexity and the costs of the detection infrastructure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stimulated by the recent advancements in the field of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), the fourth industrial revolution, also known as Industry 4.0, brings innovative and cost-efficient solutions, while imposing dramatic changes in the traditional technological design of these infrastructures. Essentially, these systems represent industrial cyber-physical production systems [1] (also associated more recently to the Industrial Internet of Things [2] ) where the massive proliferation of ICT enabled the development of innovative applications and services, new technologies and advanced features, increased operational benefits, and reduced the costs of installations.
While the Industry 4.0 can indeed reshape the functioning of our society, it brings many challenges pertaining to the development of cyber-physical industrial architectures, resilient communication systems, and secure data exchange.
Unlike traditional ICT systems where the effects of disruptive actions are generally limited to cyber operations, in the particular case of industrial cyber-physical systems, such attacks can result in the loss of vital services. To this end, the infamous Stuxnet malware is believed to be the first malware specifically designed to attack industrial installations. Its ability to rewrite the control logic of industrial hardware and more importantly, to hide its presence from system engineers, brought to light a new class of threats in which disturbances originating in the cyber domain can propagate to the physical realm. Subsequently, the recently reported cyber-attacks targeting the Ukrainian electricity grid [3] , [4] demonstrated the exceptional impact of cyber-physical attacks, where an ordinary malware infection may leave vast populated regions without electricity.
The advent of these advanced threats highlighted the immediate requirement to develop effective protective strategies in existing critical industrial systems. Here, security measures need to be carefully designed such that the normal functioning of industrial equipment is not disrupted. In light of these challenges, this paper develops a systematic methodology for designing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for industrial cyber-physical systems. As demonstrated by [5] and [6] , production systems may expose thousands of process variables, which cause a dramatic increase in the complexity and the costs of monitoring and detection infrastructures. Therefore, the main goal of the methodology developed in this paper is to reduce the number of monitored parameters by adopting a three-phase strategy: phase 1 embraces sensitivity analysis to identify sensitive variables to specific interventions (e.g., control signals, cyber attacks); phase 2 adopts the cross-association assessment to optimally structure the process variables in groups that are the most sensitive to groups of interventions; and lastly, phase 3 optimally assigns the most sensitive process variables to IDS, while enforcing the IDS capacity limitations and redundancy requirements.
We believe that the approach presented in this paper can bridge the gap between recently developed IDS design strategies [6] - [8] and IDS detection engines [9] , [10] , since: (i) it selects the process variables that are the most sensitive to specific interventions (i.e., cyber attacks), which could trigger early alarms even in the case of non-disruptive (i.e., stealthy) attacks; (ii) it can significantly reduce the number of process variables used by [6] - [8] , thus reducing costs; and (iii) it identifies highly correlated process variables and provides their optimal assignation to IDS in different networks, which yields a redundant detection system. Numerical results are given for a realistic Vinyl Acetate Monomer process comprising 43 measured variables and 25 control loops. The results demonstrate that the number of monitored parameters can be significantly reduced, while ensuring: the selection of the most sensitive process variables, and providing a configurable level of redundancy for the detection infrastructure.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II presents an overview of related studies. Section III presents the developed methodology, and Section IV details the experimental results. The paper concludes in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK A. OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Given the wide variety of devices, communication technologies and possible scenarios that may rise in the establishment of Industry 4.0 systems, a precise architectural description of these systems can represent a challenging undertaking. By taking into account the technological revolution, however, the Industry 4.0 can be seen as a unique technological ecosystem. These may encompass a variety of objects ranging from sensors and actuators, radio-frequency identification (RFID), industrial equipment, video surveillance cameras, to generic PCs and networking devices. In terms of communications we may find a broad range of technologies (traditional and industry-grade) including wired and wireless.
According to their geographical positioning, these industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPS) can be distributed across large geographical regions interconnected by state of the art Cloud-based solutions. To this end, there have been many recent developments and applications based on cloud-assisted industrial systems [11] . These can enable flexible processing of vast amounts of data, they can provide on-demand services and applications, with built-in support for redundancy and data availability. An example possible architecture of an ICPS is shown in Fig. 1 . 
B. RELATED WORK
The study of industrial intrusion detection systems is a well established field of research. We start by mentioning the work of Horkan [12] , which demonstrates the various opportunities and design decisions that need to be taken into account for distributing detection devices across an industrial communication network. Berthier et al. [6] identified the parameters that need to be monitored in Advanced Metering Infrastructures for detecting cyber attacks. It identified the possible location of detection elements, which may be deployed as stand-alone hardware, or may be integrated into smart meters. Zhang et al. [13] developed an IDS provisioned across different layers of the smart grid. Detection modules adopted various techniques including Support Vector Machine and Artificial Immune Systems in order to detect and to classify malicious data and possibly, cyber attacks. The work of Cardenas et al. [7] developed a cost model-based framework to aid utilities in the provisioning of intrusion detection systems. The framework leverages the output of risk assessment methodologies, which represent the input to a decision assistance model. The model can be used to analyze the tradeoff between cost and benefits of installing intrusion detection systems in different locations.
Genge et al. [8] demonstrated the significance of designing redundant communications and detection systems for industrial production systems. The methodology identified the optimal routing of communications and the optimal placement of IDS, while minimizing costs. The same authors developed in [14] an approach for optimal industrial network design that takes into account the real-time data transfer and the security recommendations outlined in the ISA-62443.03.02 standard.
Compared to the previous studies we believe the present work is complementary. As such, previous studies presume a given set of parameters that need to be monitored. However, as shown later in this paper, the physical process can be seen as a physical ''communication medium'', where groups of process variables exhibit a similar level of correlation to certain interventions. Therefore, it suffices to monitor a reduced selection of process variables, which significantly reduces the complexity of the infrastructure, and ultimately it diminishes costs. As an example, one may adopt the work of Berthier et al. [6] to list the complete set of possible variables. Then, by using the approach developed in this paper, one could identify the most sensitive and correlating variables (for redundancy purposes) for each class of interventions. Lastly, the work of Cardenas et al. [7] could be used to identify the exact positioning of IDS, while the work of Genge et al. [8] would provide the design of the communication infrastructure for routing the IDS traffic with minimal costs.
III. METHODOLOGY A. OVERVIEW
The methodology developed in this paper adopts a procedure inspired from the field of System Dynamics [15] . System Dynamics can explain over a specific time interval the dependencies between various cyber/physical assets and the process behavior. It was created by Forrester in the mid-1950s [16] as a formal modeling methodology for understanding the behavior of complex systems over time. Forresters' System Dynamics was shown to be applicable in the identification of control loop dominance [15] , that is, of control loops that dominate system behavior. The approach was further refined by Huang et al. [17] in the sensitivity analysis of control loops. Sensitivity analysis measures how ''sensitive'' a model is to changes in the value of its control parameters. The approach developed in our previous work [18] builds on the work of Ford [15] , and on the sensitivity assessment unfolded in the work of Huang et al. [17] . Particularly, our previous work builds on the assumption that a time-based cross-correlation is available for the measurements of the analyzed process in the absence and in the presence of interventions. Then, it calculates the co-variance of observed variables before and after the execution of a specific intervention. However, while this approach can provide a valuable instrument in a controlled (i.e., simulated) environment, it exhibits several shortcomings, which are addressed in this paper:
• It presumes the availability of precisely correlated measurement time series in the absence and in the presence of interventions. While such measurements can be easily obtained in a simulated environment, in production systems they would require the process to be restarted several times, which can be a costly procedure.
• It does not encapsulate a systematic methodology for tuning parameters, and it does not provide an approach for identifying and grouping observable variables.
• It is particularly aimed at ranking process variables to be used in risk assessment and network design problems.
Based on the aforementioned issues, in this paper we provide a systematic methodology addressing the design requirements of industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPS). The methodology boils down to the following phases.
Phase 1 (Process Analysis): In this phase the analysis records measurements of observable variables in the absence of an intervention, and in the presence of a specific intervention (on control or observable variables). It should be noted that this phase must acquire as much measurements as possible and feasible within the normal operating safety limits of the physical process, by including a wide range of interventions (e.g., attacks) and a wide variety of attack parameters (e.g., attack magnitude). A larger set of measurements can significantly increase the accuracy of results obtained in the next phases.
Phase 2 (Variable Cross-Association):
This phase aims to construct the correlation matrix between groups of intervention variables and groups of observed variables. The procedure determines the (groups of) observed variables that exhibit a similar sensitivity to a set (group) of attacks. By doing so, it establishes the following: (i) each group will deliver the primary and back-up (i.e., redundant) observable variables, which will contribute to the provisioning of a resilient IDS; (ii) the attack groups fuse together a large number of attack types, hence effectively reducing the number of provisioned detection engines, and ultimately, the infrastructure's costs; and (iii) it identifies the most appropriate detection algorithm for each set (group) of attack types.
Phase 3 (Optimal IDS Design):
This phase develops an optimal IDS placement methodology aimed at maximizing the sensitivity of the selected observable variables, while enforcing IDS capacity limitations, and redundancy levels. The approach is designed such that based on the IDS capacity limitations and the desired redundancy levels, it assigns the most sensitive variables to be monitored by IDS. This way, the approach takes into account the physical limitations of the detection infrastructure, and, if necessary (due to capacity constraints), imposes further the reduction in the number of monitored variables.
B. PHASE1: PROCESS ANALYSIS
In a nutshell, the methodology computes the changes in the standard deviation of observable variables in the presence and in the absence of external interventions. This is a simplified, yet realistic approach, since attackers usually pursue a wide variety of objectives, which in most cases are aimed at changing the process's parameters (i.e., to cause deviations from the normal behavior). Let J = {1, 2, . . . , j, . . . m} be the set of observed variables. We assume an intervention-free measurement of observed variables over a long time period, encompassing the normal process behavior, where y 0 jt denotes the t ∈ T -th measurement of the j ∈ J -th observed variable.
The methodology developed in Phase1 is applied on a time window w, which needs to accommodate the typical response time of a physical process. However, the response time alone may not cover the entire interval required for the process to reach a stead state. Therefore, a second term is added to accommodate the deviations of the observed variable values from their mean observed values. Furthermore, we note that the interventions need to be applied in each process state (as part of the normal behavior) in order to ensure that measurements are recorded in the complete process lifecycle. The set of process states can be easily identified by process engineers. Therefore, we use the set K to denote the time moments at which there is a change in the state of the process.
Next, let Y 0k j , k ∈ K be a vector containing w measurements for observed variable j in the time interval [k − w/2, k + w/2]. We define the intervention tuple i as a specific intervention type (e.g., attack type) applied to a selected variable, which is defined by a set of parameters including duration, amplitude, signal waveform, such that i = (var, type, parameters), and the set of interventions I = {1, 2, . . . , i, . . . n}. Every intervention i ∈ I is applied at every moment k ∈ K , and the observed variables are recorded
j denote the recorded vector for an intervention i applied at time k on the j-th observed variable.
According to [19] the relative change in the variation of measurement values can be a significant indicator of the sensitivity to the process input even if the input factors are correlated. Therefore, Phase1 embraces the standard deviation of observed variables in the absence and in the presence of a specific intervention as a means to quantify impact. The sensitivity index c jik between the j-th intervention-free observed variable and the j-th observed variable with intervention i is thus defined as the ratio between the two standard deviations:
The values of c jik are the elements of the C tensor of sensitivity, which represents a detailed result of the sensitivity analysis procedure. The frontal slice of the C tensor denoted by C ::k , or more simply C k , represents the sensitivity index matrix at a specific process state at time k. We note that the above-procedure is applied at every k ∈ K , which can produce different sensitivity indexes in each case. Therefore, it is important to analyze these differences and to identify sensitivity indexes that best characterize the process over its entire life-cycle. Given that the same intervention set I can be applied at every k moment, we evaluate the difference between the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the sensitivity index values obtained at moments k 1 , and k 2 . By using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test, if the maximum absolute difference between the cumulative distribution functions is below or equivalent to a critical value, we consider that the sensitivity index matrix at moment k can characterize the complete process life-time. In this case we define R as the single sensitivity matrix:
Otherwise, we collapse the time slice of the tensor C in a single sensitivity index matrix R as a weighted (wg k ) sum of all the slices across time. Understanding the time parameters of physical processes allows us to determine the weight values. In this case R is defined as:
The next phase of the assessment uses the sensitivity index matrix R to identify the group of interventions that have the same impact on a group of observed variables. The result of this procedure will reduce the number of variables that need to be monitored by identifying groups of variables that exhibit similar sensitivity indexes to groups of attacks. We start by observing that two major components contribute to the variation of the observed variable's standard deviation: the measurement noise and the type of intervention. Considering the random nature of the noise, we can identify at least two different components in the probability distribution function of the sensitivity index coefficients. Since the Gaussian distribution component is the effect of noise on measurements, any other component can be considered as a detectable effect of an intervention. As the interventions are different in magnitude and duration, in this phase we separate the sensitivity index coefficients in two clusters. The first cluster comprises non-sensitive cluster index values, which are mostly influenced by noise rather than the intervention. The second cluster then comprises values sensitive to groups of interventions. We then use the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm to separate the two components and to obtain the binary version (Rb) of the R matrix. In this matrix, if Rb(j, i) = 1, we conclude that variable j is sensitive to intervention i. Conversely, a value of zero translates to a non-sensitive variable.
Based on this transformation, we use a fully automatic cross-association to simultaneously cluster the Rb matrix into disjoint row-column groups. The optimization method uses the Minimum Description Length [20] principle to encode a binary matrix as a minimal length binary stream. The method proposed in [21] gives a binary sparse matrix B of dimension mxn; it determines the optimal number of row groups p and column groups q to obtain a uniform structure of crossassociate sub-matrices B gf that minimize the code length:
The code length of the lossless encoded matrix B is
, where H is the entropy function, VOLUME 5, 2017 and P(B) is the density function and is calculated by dividing the number of non-zero elements to the total number of elements.
The cross-association algorithm defines two major steps: (i) for a given p, q it determines the sub-matrices arrangement of the smallest length; and (ii) it searches the best values for p and q using the previously determined arrangement. Finally, the two indexing functions G, F describe the assignment of rows (observed variables) to row groups and the assignment of columns (interventions) to column groups:
To determine the most sensitive observed variable for every intervention group, we select the list of variables which are members of the highest density sub-matrices, according to the following equation:
For the selected variables we compute the maximum value for sensitivity index (R) pertaining to the interventions from the f intervention group:
where s jf indicates the observed variables that are the most sensitive and that correlate the most to a specific attack group f . This constitutes the input to Phase3.
D. PHASE3: OPTIMAL IDS DESIGN
Based on the computation of intervention groups, Phase3 computes the optimal assignation of IDS to monitor a selection of observable variables in each intervention group f . This phase also ensures that selections of observable variables in the same group f are monitored on different sub-networks such that in the case an IDS from one network is compromised, a different IDS (located in a separate network) can still signal an abnormal behavior. The communication infrastructure can be viewed as a nondirected graph consisting of networks (i.e., nodes) and communication links (i.e., edges). We further presume that an IDS can monitor a variable in a certain node only if the traffic is routed across this node. Let ν denote a sub-network in the architecture of an ICPS. Then, let γ jν be a binary parameter with value 1 if j can be monitored in node ν (i.e., the traffic encompassing j traverses network ν), η jf a binary parameter with value 1 if j is part of the intervention group f , ν the maximum capacity of IDS in network ν, and β L , β U the desired lower and upper redundancy levels, respectively.
The binary variable ϒ jν constitutes the solution of the optimization problem by indicating (with value=1) that j is monitored in network ν. Lastly, the binary variable νf indicates that the intervention group f is monitored in network ν.
νf is used to ensure that groups of observable variables in f are monitored on separate networks. The IDS design problem is formulated as follows:
By maximizing the sum of s jf ϒ jν , the objective function enforces the selection of maximum sensitivity variables for monitoring purposes. Constraints (9) enforce that: j is monitored on network ν only if there is traffic related to j; that j is monitored at most on one network; and that the monitoring capacity ν is not exceeded. Constraints (10) ensure that νf = 1 only if there is at least one variable j from intervention group f that is monitored on network ν (where α is a large integer value). Lastly, constraints (11) enforce the minimum and maximum level of redundancy.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We evaluate the developed methodology on a realistic Vinyl Acetate Monomer (VAM) process model. We define several intervention models and we demonstrate the application of each phase on the selected process.
A. PROCESS DESCRIPTION
The VAM is a fundamental ingredient in a wide variety of industrial and consumer products including paints, adhesives, resins and many other. It is the product of a large-scale chemical process consisting of several basic unit operations including: a vaporizer, a catalytic plug-flow reactor, a feedeffluent heat exchanger (FEHE), a vapor/liquid separator, a gas compressor, an absorber, a CO 2 removal system, an azeotropic distillation column with a decanter, and a tank for the liquid recycle stream. The VAM is produced starting from fresh and recycled Ethylene (C 2 H 4 ), Oxygen (O 2 ), and acetic acid (HAc). These are converted into vinyl acetate, producing as byproducts the water (H 2 O) and carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) components. The fresh C 2 H 4 stream is combined with an inert C 2 H 6 component. The following equations describe the functionality of the VAM:
According to [22] , the VAM process is subject to two essential safety constraints:
• The oxygen composition must not exceed 8 mol % in the gas recycle loop. This is needed so that the process remains outside the explosivity envelope of ethylene. • The pressure in the gas recycle loop and distillation column cannot exceed 140 psia because of the mechanical construction limit of the process vessels. Given that the two safety constraints are critical for the safe operation of the VAM process, the oxygen composition and the pressure in the gas recycle loop and distillation column are monitored in several points of the process. In the case either of these limits is exceeded, the process is shut down via interlocks. In [22] we also find the following operating constraints, which are needed to ensure efficient production without interruption:
• The peak temperature in the reactor must remain below 200 • C to prevent mechanical damage.
• Liquid levels in the vaporizer, separator, absorber base, distillation column base, and decanter must operate within the 10-90% limits.
• The inlet reactor temperature must exceed 130 • C to avoid condensation.
• The acetic acid in the decanter organic phase must not exceed 600 mol/million to prevent product contamination.
• The composition of the vinyl acetate in the bottom streams must remain below 100 mol/million to minimize polymerization and fouling. The VAM model has been made available to a wider audience by Chen et al. [23] in the form of MATLAB code. It includes 246 states, 26 control variables, and 43 observed variables. Readers are referred to [23] for a complete description of the model. Fig. 2 depicts the main components and control loops of the VAM process.
B. INTERVENTION MODELS
While an attacker might aim at provoking physical damage or process shut down by actions causing the violation of safety and operational constraints, such actions would immediately trigger alarms, the replacement of damaged hardware, and ultimately the discovery of the attacker. Furthermore, the aim of the developed methodology is to identify the variables that correlate to specific interventions, and not to identify attacks that cause process shut down. To this end, we presume that the attacker performs more subtle attacks, which do not cause the violation of safety and operational constraints.
The interventions adopted in the numerical examples that follow are modeled according to five generic integrity attacks, which are commonly used in the literature for security studies [24] . These are not aimed at being exhaustive, but are provided to showcase the methodology in the context of a wide range of attack scenarios. Additional interventions may be considered, according to the specific characteristics of each scenario. Given the attack time interval [T start , T stop ], the following class of attacks are defined [24] :
Pulse Attack: In this case the target variable X j (t) is divided by an attack parameter ap, yielding a pulse-like effect within the bounds of [T start , T stop ].
Scaling Attack: The target variable X j (t) is scaled according to an attack parameter ap: X * j (t) = ap · X j (t). Ramp Attack: Here, the target variable X j (t) is subsequently scaled by a percentage of its value (denoted by the attack parameter ap): X * j (t) = X j (t) + ap · t · X j (t). Random Attack: During this intervention the target variable's value X j (t) is changed by a randomly selected percentage of its value (attack parameter ap) selected from a uniform random distribution interval (−ap, ap):
Replay Attack: This is a commonly found attack in the literature and presumes replaying a previously recorded set of values (in the interval T r start and T r stop in the past). In this case X * j (t) = X j (t ), where t ∈ [T r start , T r stop ]. Fig. 3 depicts the normal operation of the VAM process (VAMP) based on a selection of six observed variables. It can be seen that the process exhibits two major states: an initialization phase, followed by a stable state. On the other hand, the operation of the VAMP in the presence of the five interventions mentioned above is depicted in Fig. 4 . The interventions are applied for a period of three minutes on the manipulated variable in the first control loop, that is, the percentage of oxygen injected into the reactor unit. Here we observe that the pulse, scaling, ramp and random attacks have a clear and observable effect. Conversely, the effect of the replay attack is barely visible. This is explained by the fact that the replay attack injects the recorded normal control signals preceding the attack, which do not deviate from the normal values as much as the attack signals generated in the other types of attacks.
C. PHASE1
In the first phase of the analysis we evaluate the effect of applying interventions at different moments in the process lifetime. We show that, at least in the case of the VAMP, we record statistically consistent impact values regardless of the moment that the intervention is applied.
We applied the five intervention types at different moments in steps of 200 minutes (e.g., at 100 minutes, 300 minutes, etc.). Each type of intervention was applied with two different attack parameters as tabulated in Table 1 . Each intervention was applied on all control variables and lasted for 3 minutes. Overall, we recorded measurements at 20 different moments, and we performed a total of 1040 experiments. By subsequently applying the various interventions we measured the process response time and we selected a time window of 100 minutes. Then, at each moment we measured the standard deviation in the absence and in the presence of an intervention. Fig. 5 shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of deviation distributions in the absence and in the presence of all the aforementioned interventions recorded at 20 different moments in time. We observe that the standard deviations exhibit a similar behavior across all 43 observable variables. This means that the deviations are part of the same distribution and that interventions can be applied at any moment in the process lifetime. To further confirm this aspect we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test (K-S test) [25] . The null hypothesis is that the standard deviations recorded in the first moment (at 100min) and the ones recorded later on are from the same distribution. The result of the test is 1 if the test rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level, and is 0 otherwise. As depicted in Fig. 6 , the result of the K-S test is below 0.05 (i.e., 5%) in all cases, which yields the acceptance of the null hypothesis.
D. PHASE2
The second phase starts by separating the random noise values from the sensitivity indexes that are a direct consequence of interventions. The histogram of the complete set of sensitivity indexes is depicted in Fig. 7a . As described earlier, we separate the sensitivity index coefficients in two clusters. The first cluster is depicted in Fig. 7b and comprises the nonsensitive cluster index values, which are mostly influenced by noise. On the other hand, the second cluster, depicted in Fig. 7c , comprises values sensitive to interventions.
Next, we apply the cross-association methodology described in [21] to obtain the optimal number of attack groups and the optimal number of variable groups that may be used to detect these interventions. The result of this procedure is depicted in Fig. 7d . The figure shows in gray-scale color coding the density and, consequently, the ability to detect a group of interventions (i.e., attacks). Here, the black color indicates a high densitivity group where most variables are sensitive to attacks included in the group. Conversely, the white color indicates a low densitivity group where variables are not sensitive to specific attack groups. Overall, the cross-association identified five variable groups and four attack groups. Each variable group exhibits a certain densitivity level (color-coded in Fig. 7d ) for detecting a certain group of attacks. For example, variables in group 1 (first from the bottom in Fig. 7d ) are most sensitive to attacks in groups 3 and 4, while variables in group 4 are sensitive to attacks in groups 2, 3, and 4. On the other hand, we observe that variables in group 5 are less sensitive to most types of attacks and that they exhibit a certain sensitivity level only to attacks in group 4.
Next, for each attack group we select the variable groups with the highest density. As shown in Table 2 , the methodology identified that 9 variables are sensitive to all attack groups. Nevertheless, attacks in group 4 can be detected by an additional number of 9 variables. These results clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of the developed methodology, since out of the 43 observable variables, only 18 variables need to be monitored. The 18 selected variables constitute 41.8%, which translates to a reduction of 58.1% in the process variables that need to be monitored.
E. PHASE3
While the previous phase identified the highly sensitive variables to specific attack groups, Phase3 provides the exact positioning of IDS in the ICPS architecture. For this purpose VOLUME 5, 2017 we presume a traditional ICPS network topology consisting of a hierarchical interconnection of sub-networks, as the one depicted in Fig. 8 . We presume that variables are measured by sensors in the process networks, their values are recorded in the control networks and are transported by traffic flows to the upper networks. The process network is the end-point of all flows and it is where all variables are stored in a central database (historian).
The IDS optimization problem was implemented in the AIMMS software [26] and we used the popular CPLEX 
solver to determine the optimal allocation of IDS. We showcase the applicability of the developed optimization problem by testing the effect of various values for the capacity of an IDS engine ( ν ), for the lower and the upper redundancy levels (β L and β U ), on the solution of the optimization problem. According to [27] , the VAMP comprises two main units: Unit 1 encompasses the reaction and gas recycle components, and Unit 2 encompasses the components enabling the refinement of the final product. Fig. 2 shows the physical distribution of the two units, where Unit 1 and Unit 2 are situated on the left and the right, respectively, of the vertical dotted line. From a network perspective, the two units are depicted in Fig. 8 . We presume that the supervisory and control sub-networks in Unit 1 route the flows pertaining to 24 observable variables, while the sub-networks in Unit 2 route the remaining flows comprising 19 observable variables. The distribution of the observable variables in the two units is included in Table 3 .
We observe that for ν = 5, β L = 2, β U = 2, the optimization problem delivers a two-level redundancy for the monitored variables in all four attack groups. As depicted in Fig. 9a , the solution selects five variables from all four attack groups to be monitored in Unit 1, and four variables from all attack groups to be monitored in Unit 2. Additionally, the IDS positioned in Unit 2 monitors five variables sensitive to [23] as: '1' is the vaporizer pressure, '3' is the vaporizer temperature, '4' is the heater exit temperature, '5' is the reactor exit temperature, '8' is the FEHE hot exit temperature, '10' is the separator temperature, '11' is the compressor exit temperature, '12' is the absorber pressure, and '14' is the circulation cooler exit temperature. attacks in group four (out of which four are also sensitive to attacks in groups 1, 2, and 3).
By increasing the capacity of the IDS to 8 (see Fig. 9b ), we observe an increase in the number of monitored variables, while maintaining the requested redundancy level. Next, we increased the upper redundancy level β U to 3 and to 4. As depicted in Fig. 9c and 9d , the solution changes accordingly, and in the case it is feasible, the solution will provide the maximum level of redundancy. We observe that for β U = 4 a maximum redundancy level of 4 for attack groups 1, 2 and 3 is not provided because all observable variables from these groups are already selected, and the lower redundancy level of 2 is satisfied.
Lastly, we observe that in all cases the limitations pertaining to capacity and redundancy levels further reduce the number of monitored parameters, while enforcing the selection of observable variables with the highest sensitivity levels. This is explained by the use of the maximization function in the optimization problem, which selects the observable variables that maximize the sum of sensitivity indexes. To this end, for ν = 5, β L = 2, β U = 2, the percentage of monitored parameters decreases down to 10. This yields a reduction by 76.8% in the number of parameters that need to be monitored by the IDS. In the case of ν = 8, β L = 2, β U = 2 the methodology selects 16 parameters to be monitored, which yields a reduction of 62.8%. In the scenario of ν = 5, β L = 2, β U = 3 the number of monitored parameters is of 15, yielding a reduction by 65.2%. Lastly, in the case of Table 4 .
F. DISCUSSION
While the developed methodology can indeed identify the set of most sensitive parameters to a given attack palette, a few observations need to be made on its limitations. As demonstrated by the earlier experiments, the attacks targeting a physical process may have a lower or higher impact according to the process dynamics. In fact, certain parameters may not even react at all to a given set of attacks. Nonetheless, industrial processes usually have a few representative parameters that are identified by process engineers to be the most critical. Such parameters reflect the process state and are the ones that react the most even in the presence of minor external disturbances.
To illustrate the validity of this statement in the case of the VAMP we applied the proposed methodology on a progressively increased set of attacks selected from the previous experiments. The attacks have been selected as follows. The first attack set includes the pulse (Setting 1) and the replay (Setting 1) attacks. The second attack set includes the pulse (Setting 1), scaling (Setting 2), ramp (Setting 2), and replay (Setting 1) attacks. The third attack set includes the pulse (Setting 1), scale (Setting 1 and 2), ramp (Setting 2), random (Setting 1), and replay (Setting 1 and 2) . Lastly, the fourth attack set includes the complete palette of attacks, as listed in Table 1 . Fig. 10 illustrates the sensitivity indexes, while Fig. 11 depicts the result of the cross-association in the case of the four attack sets. As shown by results, the sensitivity indexes VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 11. Evolution of the cross-association procedure.
exhibit a certain periodicity where their values drop to 0. This is owed to the parameters that exhibit a low sensitivity to most attacks, due to the fact that they are not used in control loops since they are mainly the result of computations based on critical parameters values.
On the other hand, the repeated application of the crossassociation procedure on a growing number of attacks confirms our initial statement according to which a process is usually characterized by a group of process parameters that exhibit a high degree of sensitivity even in the case of minor disturbances. To this end, the result of the crossassociation identified the variable group consisting of the nine parameters, as already included defined in Table 2 (AG-1). This group of parameters was identified by the crossassociation in Fig. 11a starting from the first application of the procedure, as being able to successfully detect all attacks included in the experimental scenario. The same group was constructed by the cross-association in the results depicted in Fig. 11b, 11c, and 11d . Therefore, as a final recommendation in the application of the proposed methodology, one needs to ensure that the interventions target critical process parameters that ultimately affect the process state.
V. CONCLUSION
We developed a three-phase methodology aimed at reducing the complexity and the costs of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) provisioned within the emerging Industry 4.0 systems. The experiments conducted on a Vinyl Monomer Acetate process demonstrated: (i) that the number of monitored process variables can be reduced by 76.8% (depending on the characteristics of the industrial process); and (ii) that the approach can indicate the positioning of specific types of IDS while enforcing the desired level of redundancy and ensuring that capacity limitations are not exceeded. We recognize that the approach is not a substitute for the existing IDS design methodologies. On the contrary, we believe that our approach complements the previous studies and that it should be included as a supplementary step in the design of costefficient and resilient IDS for Industry 4.0 systems.
